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Abstract
In the 1980' a discussion started whether or not a social underclass was developing in th e
Netherlands. In this article the emphasis is on  the contribution of such factors as the increase
of international competition and technological innovation to the explanation of the growing
numbers of people structurally excluded from the labour market. From an analysis of th e
relevant literature and secondary data a trend emerges that makes us to expect that in th e
near future more and more people will be structurally expelled from the labour marke t
despite the present Dutch policy of labour costs reduction and training the unemployed .
Instead of setting full employment as a target, a reorientation of social policy seems to be
more realistic and appropriate.2
1. Introduction
In October 1984 the leader of the Dutch Labour Party and former Prime Minister,
J.M. den Uyl, stated in Parliament:
'Mister Chairman ... I dare to say: Our society is on the edge of breaking down. Ever widening
gulfs are outlined against the horizon between those who have jobs and those who are excluded
from the labour process, between those who have a prospect of higher incomes and those who see
their purchasing powers weakening, between those who have the opportunities to participate in
new technological and economic developments and those for whom the gateways to the future
seem to be closed.'
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In the Netherlands Den Uyl's speech provoked a public debate in which not onl y
politicians, but also economists and social scientists participated. There are thre e
interdependent reasons why Den Uyl's statement caused rather passionat e
discussions. The first relates to the objectives of socio-economic policy. In 195 6
objectives of socio-economic policy were formulated  which became generally
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accepted by all political parties, trade unions and em ployers organizations and which
were considered to be the cornerstones of the D utch welfare state. In his speech Den
Uyl implicitly suggested that two of these,  full employment and a socially acceptable
distribution of national income, had become obsolete.
Secondly, Den Uyl claimed a dichotomy of Du tch society to be growing, the rise
of a new social underclass consisting of people permanently unemployed an d
therefore unable to participate in society.  And, thirdly, the very existence of th e
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Dutch welfare state was therewith challenged.
In 1985 the Dutch social scientists Köbben and Godschalk issued a report i n
which they presented the debate  following Den Uyl's statement and investigated the
issue at hand, i.e. the claimed growth of the number of people permanentl y
economically non-active and its social consequences.  Their main conclusion was
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that the economically non-active are a very heterogeneous social category as i t
consists not only of the unemployed, but also of those receiving social assistanc e
benefits and disability benefits. Consequently, within the category of th e
economically non-active, people do not only have different income levels, but also




consider them as belonging to the same social  class without loosing sight on what
is really going on in society.
Almost a decade later the debate has still not ended. Recent publications stil l
emphasize the growth of a social  dichotomy.  Thus in 1990 Engbersen summarizes:
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'In the Netherlands an underclass, which does not benefit from the economic revival in the second
half of the eighties threatens to emerge. A large group of unemployed people in the inner cities of
the Randstad  (including many alochthonous people) remains completely unaffected by economic
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prosperity. This underclass consists of different groups of citizens that have one important thing
in common: they have no prospects of getting out of their marginal and State-dependent position.'
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The fact that a relatively large part of the Dutch  labour force did not benefit from
the economic revival in the second half of the 1980s is explained by differen t
factors. In his study of insecurity of subsistence De Lange mentions 'deficiencies in
national economic and technological development, climate of capital investment ,
cost of labour, individual market capacities (level of education, professiona l
experience), motivations, consu mption behaviour, bureaucratic skills, and the like.'
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On the level of national socio-economic policy many authors stress demographi c
factors that imbalance the demand and supply of labour , and the imperfections of the
labour market as caused by the interference of a s ocial security system characterized
by a relatively high replacement ratio.
In this article a somewhat different angle of approach is used. Without denying the
impact of the factors mentioned in the former paragraph, here the focus will be on
the nature of recent technological innovations in production processes and thei r
contribution to the explanation of the increase of people excluded from the labour
process. The main thesis will be that the rise of 'new' technology  and the
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abandoning of Fordism and associated types of production organization induce  a
qualitative shift in labour demand with the effec t that an increasing proportion of the
labour force can no longer comply with the requirements of employers.  Section 2
of this article treats Dutch social and economic policy since World War II and the
rise of structural unemploy ment in recent years. In section 3 it is explained how the4
qualitative changes in labour demand are related to the increase of internationa l
business competition and how this induces social exc lusion. In the last section policy
options are explored.
2. Dutch Socio-Economic Policy and the Rise of
Structural Unemployment
2.1. Dutch Social Policy since World War II
The Dutch economic attitude of the 1950s was domina ted by four problems.  Firstly,
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during the German occupation of the years 1940-1945 the economic infrastructure
had largely been devastated and it had to be  rebuilt as soon as possible. Secondly,
the loss of Indonesia as a rich colony was felt as an economic deprivation that had
to be compensated for economically. Thirdly, the country was confronted with  a
rapidly growing population. Fourthly, more than before the Second World War the
Dutch economy was perceived to be dependent on international markets. It wa s
generally felt that these four problems could only be solved by a major economi c
effort. All social and economic interest groups agreed that economic growth was a
national aim of the highest priority to which all group interests had to b e
subordinated.
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The Dutch trade unions took over this culture of s ocial harmony and accepted for
years a so-called Guided Wage policy, i.e. the control of wages by nationa l
government aimed at the restrict ion of the wage level.  The economic policy of the
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1950s succeeded in effecting a decrease of the labour share in income, a relativ e
reduction of the tax burden and a relative increase of pr ofits. This laid the foundation
of the economic expansion of the 1960s and, as the labour market tightened ,
favoured the position of labour.
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Guided Wage policy became untenable in view of rising profits, economi c
growth and a tight labour market. Under th e circumstances of the late 1950s it could
no longer be regarded as a national interest. In 1959 Guided Wage policy wa s5
abolished and freedom of negotiation restored. The 1960s were characterized b y
increasing claims on prosperity achieved by the efforts of the 1950s. These claims
resulted, among other things, in public sector growth and an increase of the labour
share in income. The Dutch Welfare State matured and became outstanding in the
industrialized world.
In the late sixties the economic climate started to deteriorate. The public secto r
expanded rapidly and continued to do so till the 1980s. A spectacular increase o f
unemployment in the late 1970s weakened the bargaining power of the unions to a
substantial degree. Government and empl oyers presented to the unions the necessity
of a restricted wage policy as a mean to improve the export position of the Dutc h
economy. It was argued that an increase of real wages and social benefits woul d
imply a further rise of unemployment. Additional to this policy concept, it wa s
stipulated by the government that the cou ntry could only recover from the economic
downfall of the 1970s if free entrepreneurship and the functioning of marke t
mechanisms - especially that of the labour market - would be restored.
Gradually social policy lost its position as a more or  less independent domain.
It became the servant of economic policy as it was strongly believed that once the
aim of a healthy economy was reached, social and economic deprivation woul d
consequently disappear. In the meantime s ome of the objectives of social policy had
to be sacrificed.
In the 1980s reduction of public expenditures became a corner stone of Dutc h
socio-economic policy, partly to decrease a growing budgetary deficit of the state,
partly to reduce the costs of labour as many social insurances are paid for b y
employers' and employees' contributions. As a result the levels of social securit y
benefits like social assistance, unemployment and disability benefits wer e
substantially lowered, while at the same time the definitions as to the eligibility for
these benefits were narrowed down. Next to the argument of reducing the costs of
labour the latter was done because it was fe lt that the generous Dutch social security
system offered too few incentives for the non-active part of the labour force t o
participate in the labour market. Consequently, the replacement ratio which was in
the period 1954 -1964 less than 60 per cent and reached in 1975 a peak of 75 pe r
cent, after 1983 started to decrease with about 2 per cent annually.
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2.2. The Rise of Structural Unemployment
In the 1970s and 1980s the policy of enhancing the competitiveness of the Dutc h
economy by reducing the costs of labour turned out to be rather successful. A large
number of new jobs were created. However, this did no t decrease the unemployment
figures. After every turn of the business cycle unemployment rose to a higher level
than before.  This is not exclusively a Dutch phenomenon, but can be observed in
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almost all industrialized countries: for all OECD countries ultimate 199 3
unemployment rose to 8.5 per cent of  the labour force which was 50 per cent higher
than the unemployment figure of 1990.  Exceptions to this trend of increasin g
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unemployment seem to be the US and Japan. More than in Europe nowadays U S
unemployment has a cyclical character. This can be explained by adjustments i n
wage levels. In recent years the US saw a  decrease of 20 per cent in real income per
hour for low-skilled young men.  As a result the wages of low-skilled workers have
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sunk below the poverty line.  Japanese unemployment is comparatively still lo w
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because of a high level of hidden unemployment in the Japanese economy and the
existence of highly competitive export industries.
Unemployment in the Netherlands is foremost a social problem because of it s
persistent character. The proportion of long term unemploym ent - i.e. unemployment
of over one year - in total unemployment rose from 15 per cent in 1970 to 21 pe r
cent in 1980 and 50 per cent in 1984.  In the years 1992 and 1993 about 45 per cent
18
of the Dutch unemployed were without a job for more than on e year, while in the US
and Japan this percentage was 7 respectively 18 per cent.
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In table 1 the Dutch labour force is presented in absolute numbers. Table  2
presents Dutch registered unemployment as a percentage of the labour force .
'Registered'  means that the unemployed are registered at the labour exchange and
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are available for the labour market for more than 12 hours a week and activel y
seeking a job. This definition implies that the so-called discouraged worker effect
is excluded from table 2 as well as types of hidden unemployment by earl y
retirement, by disability and by governmental job creation in special programs for
the long term unemployed and the youth. In this sense registered unemploymen t
presents a flattered image of 'real' unemployment.
To get some idea of the amount of people excluded fro m the labour market in the7
Netherlands the number of employment related benefits are presented in table 3 .
Although the figures of table 3 cannot be taken as exact representations of 'real '
unemployment, they undoubtedly point to the fact that the actual labour slack i s
much higher than registered unemployment wants us to believe.
Going back to table 2, in 1994 compared to  total unemployment (7.5 per cent)
registered unemployment was disproportionally high among those younger than 25
years of age (11.1 per cent), allochthonous people (19 per cent) and the low skilled
workers (19.3 per cent). On the other hand,  unemployment among the elderly seems
to be relatively low (3.8 per cent). However, we have to realize that the registered
unemployment rate of those abo ve 55 years of age is highly biased. Firstly, because
many of that age category are in  early retirement schemes and, secondly, because
they form a large proportion within the ca tegory of the disabled. In 1990 40 per cent
of the 8
Table 1: Dutch Labour Force (x 1000) by Age, Ethnicity and Level of Education, 1988-1994.
1)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Age:
 < 25 1,148 1,112 1,085 1,055 1,024 988 945
 25-34 1,796 1,834 1,902 1,961 2,002 2,053 2,057
 35-44 1,584 1,623 1,672 1,711 1,716 1,724 1,752
 45-54 959 988 1,031 1,105 1,190 1,281 1,337
 55-64 380 373 373 357 363 361   377
Ethnicity:
Autochthonous 5,397 5,444 5,563 5,670 5,761 5,826 n.a.
Allochthonous: 470 485 499 519 536 580 n.a.
 Turkey 48 51 62 62 69 68 n.a.
 Morocco 30 31 33 33 38 37 n.a.
 other Mediterranean 44 40 38 46 42 43 n.a.
 Surinam 77 87 87 98 92 108 n.a.
 Netherlands Antilles 15 17 18 20 22 26 n.a.
 other 256 260 260 261 273 299 n.a.
Level of Education:
2)
 low n.a. n.a. 709 670 651 613 n.a.
 low medium n.a. n.a. 1,527 1,547 1,527 1,510 n.a.
 high medium n.a. n.a. 2,494 2,624 2,667 2,749 n.a.
 higher vocational n.a. n.a. 887 937 995 1,061 n.a.
 university n.a. n.a. 412 403 449 468 n.a.
Total Labour Force 5,867 5,929 6,063 6,189 6,296 6,406 6,466
Source  :  Enquête Beroepsbevolking 1993, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen, 1994, tables 2 and 3, pp. 80,81. For definitions: see note 20.
Notes   :   Desaggregated data may not add up to the total labour force because of rounding in thousands.
1)
 The figures of Level of Education do not add up to the total labour force figure because the category 'education unknown' is not included.
2)9
Table 2: Dutch Registered Unemployed as a Percentage of the Dutch Labour Force by Age, Ethnicity and Level of Education, 1988-1994.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Age:
 < 25 11.5 9.8 7.8 7.0 7.5 10.1 11.1
 25-34 8.1 7.4 6.1 5.7 5.6 6.9 8.2
 35-44 6.2 5.8 5.3 4.9 4.9 5.6 6.9
 45-54 6.4 5.5 5.4 4.7 4.4 5.0 5.9
 55-64 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.6 2.9 3.1 3.8
Ethnicity:
Autochthonous 6.7 5.9 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.4 6.4
Allochthonous: 19.0 18.0 16.0 15.0 15.0 17.0 19.0
 Turkey 36.0 42.0 34.0 33.0 26.0 32.0 36.0
 Morocco 31.0 31.0 35.0 31.0 30.0 36.0 31.0
 other Mediterranean 15.0 14.0 10.0 13.0 9.0 15.0 17.0
 Surinam 26.0 19.0 18.0 15.0 16.0 16.0 18.0
 Netherlands Antilles 38.0 27.0 22.0 20.0 19.0 23.0 30.0
 other 12.0 11.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 12.0
Level of Education:
 low n.a. n.a. 15.2 14.1 13.7 15.7 19.3
 low medium n.a. n.a. 6.8 5.9 6.1 8.1 9.0
 high medium n.a. n.a. 3.6 3.7 3.7 4.7 5.6
 higher vocational n.a. n.a. 3.9 3.6 3.5 4.1 4.6
 university n.a. n.a. 4.8 4.2 4.4 5.1 5.8
Total 7.7 6.9 5.9 5.4 5.3 6.5 7.5
Note: For definitions see note 20.10
disabled workers were older than 55 years  of age which was 7 per cent of the labour
force of that year.  In the 1970s and 1980s both the ea rly retirement schemes (VUT)
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and the Disability Scheme (WAO) were with the silent consent of government and
unions used by employers to repulse older  employees with a relatively low marginal
utility.
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Table 3: Unemployment and Unemployment Related Benefits per Ultimo 1993.
Source of Benefit Numbers of Benefits
unemployment private sector 935,000
unemployment public sector  50,000
sheltered workshops  80,000
projects for the unemployed  40,000
921,000 disabled workers of which are to some degree  ???
unemployed
Source: Sociale Nota 1993.
One may wonder why despite the suc cessful creation of a large number of new jobs
in the 1980s the growth of un employment continued and why it remained persistent
in character. Firstly, in the second half of the 1980s the Dutch labour market had to
absorb a wave of new entrants: nine out of ten new jobs were occupied b y
newcomers.  This was not only due to demographical factors, but it  resulted also
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from socio-cultural develop ments, notably the increase of women's participation on
the labour market: compared to other industrialized c ountries the Dutch participation
rate for women has always been rather low. A change of attitude in the 1970s and
1980s as to the position and the role of women in society led to a catch-up effect.
Secondly, in the 1970s and the 19 80s the employment structure changed. A shift
took place from industry to services.  Especially those branches within industr y
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characterized by low paid labour suffered from the rise of the New Industrializing
Countries.  In the second half of the 1980s employment rose for those with higher
25
and senior vocational training, but decreased for  those of a lower educational level.
2611
This seems to be contradict ory to the fact that in the period 1983-1990 employment
growth at the bottom of the labour market was proportionally large: 53 per cen t
(116,000 jobs) which was about three times as high as the average growth o f
employment (19 per cent).  However, these were mainly jobs at the base of th e
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labour hierarchy characterized by flexible contracts and  minimal or no job security.
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They were mainly occupied by new entrants to the labour market.
A third factor that may account  for the persistent nature of unemployment in the
Netherlands is the Dutch social security system and the existence of a minimu m
wage level. Therewith the unemployed  are enabled to be selective in the acceptance
of jobs while at the same time the costs of labour of a low marginal utility become
too high. Thus the unions complain that the jobs availa ble at the bottom of the labour
market are of low quality, have no job security and offer no prospects to th e
employees. At the other side, employers' associations try politically to promote the
abolition of the minimum wage level as a major barrier to the solution of th e
unemployment problem.
3. Structural Unemployment and the Qualitative
Change of Labour Demand
3.1. Reactions to the Internationalization of Business
The conclusion from the f ormer sections must be that the last decade Dutch society
is confronted with a growing problem of structural long term unemployment o f
which the victims are mainly the young, the lower educated, the allochthonous and
the elderly workers. These are not  separate categories. In many cases they coincide.
So many immigrants seeking a job have serious language problems and have a low
level of education. In many cases their different cultural backgrounds hinder them
to adapt to the requirements of the Dutch labour  market; many elderly workers often
have a lower education.12
In the former section we mentioned that in the 1970s and 1980s the Dutc h
employment structure changed. Many low skilled jobs were lost to NIC countrie s
and recently also to East European countries  formerly belonging to the Soviet block.
Because of a growing international competition of business low skilled labou r
intensive industries could no longer compete because of the relatively high level of
Dutch labour costs. So they were forced to move labour intensive production t o
countries with lower wage levels.
A second solution to face international competition was found in shiftin g
production from the formal to the informal 'black' economy. Some employers di d
so by subcontracting. In this respect the case of the large Dutch clothing-stores i s
notorious. Many of these used illegal sweat shops to produce clothing; in turn these
sweat shops recruited illegal alien workers who because of their weak legal status
were forced to accept wages far below the official minimum wage level. Othe r
employers, notably small enterprises in horticulture, directly hired informal labour
in order to meet production peaks.
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The flexibilization of labour contracts is a third trend that can be related t o
economic competition. It mea ns that job security is offered by the employer only to
those workers whose labour is regarded to belong to the core business of th e
company and of which the qualifications are considered to be scarce on the labour
market. Workers who do not comply to these criteria are off ered temporary contracts
- directly or via manpower agencies - for a limited period of time. This solution is
different from the one descri bed in the former paragraph because here the contracts
comply to Dutch Labour Law offering the workers normal wages and providin g
them with social security rights in cases of sickness and unemployment. In th e
former section we noted that in the period 1983-1990 most jobs created at the base
of the labour hierarchy were characterized by flexible contracts.
The fourth alternative to fight international competition was specialization. It i s
believed that western industrialized countries can only economically survive b y
either reducing production costs or by investing  in knowledge intensive sectors of
the economy. Therewith the employment shift from labour intensive industries t o
services and the growing demand for those with higher and senior vocationa l
training.13
3.2. The Contribution of Technological Innovation to Structural
Unemployment
The policy of production organizations to fight international competition b y
technological innovation raises the question how the latter contributes to structural
unemployment and the segmentation  of the labour market as analyzed in the former
section. If technological innovation results in an increase of skill requirements i t
seems reasonable to assume that the ch ances of low skilled workers to get a job will
be reduced. The fact that Dutch long term structural unemployment i s
disproportionally high among those of a low education seems to make thi s
hypothesis plausible.
Regarding the relationship between technological innovation and th e
development of skill requirements four generations of research and theorizin g
regarding the relation between technological innovation and skill requirements can
be distinguished.  In the 1950s and 1960s the first generation saw increasin g
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automation resulting in a substantial improvement of the quality of labour because
it observed a broadening of job contents and an up grading of skills relative to the job
requirements of the assemb ly line.  The second generation was heavily inspired by
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the Marxist paradigm.  Instead of upgrading, progressive automation had  a
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degrading effect on job requirements. This 'degrading thesis' could be explained by
the tendency in capitalist societies to 'a constant search for lower production costs
and greater control over a potentially recalcitrant labour  force'.  In the late 1970s
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and early 1980s a reaction was formulated against both the upgrading and th e
degrading hypothesis. This 'contextualist' generation  generated research into factors
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such as the balance of political power, union organ ization, market conditions and the
like that could override any direct effect technology might have on skills.'
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At present a new trend becomes discernable. New attempts are made to reac h
modest generalizations. R ecent research is not only interpreted as counter-evidence
against the deskilling hypothesis, but as evidence for a net upgrading trend. As  a
result of economic competition in the late 1980s and early 1990s firms more an d
more invest in new technology. New technology in general demands more skills of
the workers. At the same time within organi zations some pockets of de-skilling may14
remain to exist. However, the result of the development and application of ne w
technology will be a net upgrading of jobs.
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Another approach to get some grip on the relationship between technologica l
development and changing skill requirements was followed by Hirschhorn an d
Mockray.  In a case study through in depth interviews they tried to assess why and
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when workers feel competent and what factors help them act and work in  a
competent manner. The results of this study are quite revealing. Hirschhorn an d
Mockray expected that because of automation the problems workers had to solv e
became less complex. This turned out not to be true:
'...the workers at Westfield did not highlight any growing simplicity but rather the increasingly
abstract nature of the problems. They noted that they were more often using their heads than their
hands. Moreover, despite access to more information through the automated systems, many
emphasized their need to rely more on memory to control production.'
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Hirschhorn and Mockray bridge the gap between automation and the increase o f
skill requirements in two steps. They start with the argument that the nature of the
tools with which workers have to work changed (table 4). Secondly, because th e
tools become more integrated and complex the nature of the problems to be solved
by the workers changed (table 5) in the sense that mental work becomes mor e
important and significant. As a result th e nature of the skills required changed (table
6): in order to perform competently in an 
Table 4: The Changing Nature of Tools
FROM: TO:
A single tool A system of tools
A discontinuity between material and A seamless interaction of material and
tool tool
Sensory feedback at the juncture of tool Cognitive feedback at an interface
and material between the system and the person
Tools that narrow the worker's focus Tools that broaden the worker's focus
Source: Hirschhorn and Mokray, 1992, table 2.1., p. 21.15
Table 5: The Changing Nature of Problems to Be Solved by Workers
FROM: TO:
A few parameters Many parameters
Correcting variances Preventing Variances
Sustaining levels of output Sustaining Quality
Puzzles: a single piece Patterns: the flow, the linkages
Within a single operation Across several operations
Source: Hirschhorn and Mokray, 1992, table 2.2., p. 23.
automated work environment workers need more to plan and to control than in  a
traditional non automated production setting.
The trend from doing and respon ding to controlling and planning as analyzed by
Hirschhorn and Mockray supports the hypothesis that new technology demands  a
higher level of skill requirements and that compared to traditional systems o f
production the latter appeal much more to the cognitive abilities of the worker .
However, this is not the only effect new technology has on human labour. Modern
technological innovation also implies that production becomes more capita l
intensive. Even in service sectors like banking human labour is to a large exten t
substituted by machines. Further, in some sectors of the economy the rate o f
technological development is as high as to shorten the life cycle of capita l
substantially. This means that the depreciation of capital has become a large r
proportion of the costs of production than before.  Therefore employers are driven
to produce on a 24 hours a day basis and it becomes a vital interest for them t o
expand the working day or to introduce shiftwork where it did not exist before.




Tacit knowledge Explicit knowledge - knowing what you
know
Enacting one's knowledge Remembering one's knowledge
Awareness Awareness of one's awareness
Source: Hirschhorn and Mokray, 1992, table 2.3., p. 24.
As psychologists have shown shiftwork in the long run induces sickness an d
disability. In this respect we may expect that there exists a positive relationshi p
between the life cycle of capital and the  life cycle of workers. The higher the rate
of technological development and the more capital intensive production the sooner
in the life time of a production worker his marginal utility will sink below the level
acceptable for the employer and the sooner the worker will be expelled from th e
production process.
The employer's need to use technology as efficiently as possible leads to th e
requirement that workers should be polyvalent. Firstly, because the higher th e
relevant rate of technological development the more often workers have to learn to
work with new tools and equipment in the course of their working lifes. Secondly,
the optimal utilisation of modern technology demands of the worker that he i s
functionally flexible, i.e. that he is able to perform different tasks within th e
production process and that he can quickly shift between these tasks.
The requirement of functional flexibility is not only induced by new technology
as an isolated factor, but rather by product variety demanded by the market which
has to be answered by flexibility of the production process as a continuous process
of the joint optimalization of technology and the organization of human labour .
Therefore, it is not sufficient for the worke r to understand the parameters of his own
task and work situation. Efficient moder n production can only exist on the condition
that the worker is able to understand how the tasks he performs relate to those o f
others in the organization. He needs contextual skills, i.e. skills directed a t
integration and developed and  useful in the frame of a non-hierarchical information
structure. More specifically, contextual skills refer to the ability to learn differen t
tasks, to communicate, to cooperate, to adapt to different situations and to exer t17
leadership if needed.  These skills differ significantly from those workers need in
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a Tayloristic setting were production is realized by isolated specialization.
From the trends described above we can derive characteristics of workers required
to enable them to perform adequately in a modern production setting. These ar e
presented in table 7. This repr esentation needs some additional remarks. Firstly, the
characteristics stated are derived from major trends in mo dern production and should
therefore be considered to form the bases of hypotheses to be tested in empirica l
research. Secondly, some of the concepts a re still rather vague. As one of the results
of research we would like to know a more exact empirical reference of notably the
adjective 'minimal'.18





capable to continuous learning
capable to act autonomously
Minimal physical and mental condition
Thirdly, not all characteristics are mutually exclusive. On the one hand they can be
reduced to the level of educatio n attained, on the other hand they are to some extent
based on inborn potentials. Actually, it is not too bold to state that, ceteris paribus,
the educational level an individual can reach is limited by his inborn potentials .
Without plunging into a d iscussion on the precise respective contributions of nature
and nurture to human skills and characteristics the conclusion must be that som e
individuals have more chances to meet the characteristics required by moder n
production than others.
3.3. Economic Change and Social Exclusion
In the former sections we tried to detect the mechan isms which explain the presently
high level of structural unemployment and why it is predominantly concentrate d
among those with a relatively low  educational level. In general terms, the starting
point of the analysis was the increase of international economic competition as i t
developed the last few decades. In the Netherlands the economy reacted by th e
expulsion of labour to foreign countries characterized by comparatively low wage
levels or to the informal sector of the economy, by subcontracting and numerica l
flexibilization and by technological innovation.
Socio-economic policy was aimed at a reduction of the costs of labour, b y
removing the barriers to labour market  mobility and by increasing the incentives for19
accepting work instead of a social security benefi t. Consequently, the last decade the
replacement ratio was substantially lowered whereas the criteria of social security
eligibility were sharpened and the benefit durations shortened. The hope that these
policies would decrease the number  of those structurally and long term unemployed
turned out to be idle.
As it may be clear that the expulsion of labour to the informal economy implies
a marginalisation of its condition s, the same holds for subcontracting and numerical
flexibilization, be it to a lesser degree. As mentioned before, it is significant that in
the period 1983-1990 the substantial growth of jobs at the bottom of the labou r
market consisted mainly of jobs characterized by flexible contracts and minimal or
no job security.
On the other hand, technological  innovation has an almost opposite effect on the
labour market. In those sectors of the economy submitted to technologica l
innovation job complexity increases and therewith the level of skills required. A s
mentioned before, the latter should not only be associated with formal levels o f
education but also with personality traits of the workers which are partly shaped by
an educational career but which also originate from perso nal capacities which in turn
determine success in the educational system. Workers that comply to such skil l
requirements operate in the core sectors of the economy and are crucial to th e
production processes in which they are engaged. However, before their levels o f
productivity needed are reached they have to be trained on the job. Therefore ,
employers try to prevent labour turn over by providing them with relatively goo d
conditions of employment.
The phenomenon of supe rsession fits rather well into this trend.  On the supply
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side most workers prefer to work in the core segment of the labour market because
there the conditions of employment are best and career opportunities are provided.
On the demand side employers will  try to select the best workers they can get. As
long as jobs are scarce, employers are able to require skills that are higher tha n
actually needed for a good performance of the relevant job. The net effect of thi s
will be supersession downwards the labour hierarchy resulting in structura l
unemployment of those in the lower segments.
In 1986 Kern and Schumann published their book  Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung?
Rationalisierung in der industriellen Produktion. They pointed out that the rise of20
new technology would lead to a segmentation of the working class into fou r
categories.
The first category consists of w orkers employed in sectors characterized by new
technology and the resulting new pro duction concepts: the so-called new employees
or the core workers as we described them above. Workers in the new technolog y
sectors who are not part of the new production concepts belong to the secon d
category. These are the traditional workers that are not polyvalent because of age,
sex or immigrant status. The third category consists of workers in the traditiona l
production units and the fourth category are the unemployed.
In the analysis of social exclusion the labour market is of special importance as
it can be considered as a central institution by which scarce goods and services are
distributed in society. However,  in modern post-war industrialized societies it is not
only the labour market that fulfils this social  function. As early as 1952 M. Penelope
Hall distinguished as the essential characteristic of highly developed industria l
welfare societies that governments guarantee the participants in those societies  a
minimum level of health care, economic security, civilized living and the ability to
share in the social and cultural achievements of society.  To the degree these
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attributes cannot be realized by  the functioning of the labour market, they should be
attained by social security rights. The concept of soci al exclusion then refers to those
categories of the population that cannot share in the achievements of society a s
defined by Hall either be cause of their positions on the labour market or because of
a lack of sufficient guarantees by the social security system.
Consequently, for the study of social exclusion the Kern and Schuman n
classification has its limitations as it does not take into account the effects of social
security on the distribution of scarce goods and services in society. However, if we
would extend the classification with social security rights it  could be a useful tool
to describe social exclusion in its varying degrees. Taking then the position on the
labour market as a starting point it seems to me that presently five segments can be
discerned.
The first segment consists of the core wo rkers with medium or higher vocational
training employed in modern and knowledge intensive in dustries and services. These
core workers do have a reasonable degree of job security, have relatively hig h
incomes and their labour is of high quality.21
The second segment consists of those working in  the formal economy on flexible
contracts. They have only temporar y job security, a relatively low quality of labour,
but they are entitled to all formal rights provided by labour law and the socia l
security system. If they wish to do so, they have the opportunities to supplemen t
their incomes in the informal economy.
The third segment consists of those  on social security benefits (social assistance,
unemployment and disability benefits) who have some qualifications demanded in
the market. They therefore have the opportunity to moonlight in the informa l
economy and to supply their benefits with black earnings.
The fourth segment consists of people living on social security benefits whic h
have few or none qualifications demand ed in the labour market. Consequently, their
opportunities to leave the social security system or to earn a supplementary income
in the informal economy are minimal. Because of cut s on social security benefits the
last decade they were confronted with decreasing incomes even to the extent that a
large category is believed to live on the subsistence level. To this fourth segmen t
belongs the chronically sick, the long term unemployed and the elderly.
The fifth segment consists of those workers with a weak legal status, notabl y
illegal immigrants. They ha ve no access to the formal labour market and are forced
to work in the informal economy and to accept work of low quality with lo w
earnings and no job security . In case of sickness or unemployment they do not have
any social security rights.
We started this analysis of social exclusion with  Den Uyl's statement of 1984 that
a split in Dutch society was growing. More than ten years later his ideas are stil l
relevant. However, they need some specification. First of all, the thesis that Dutch
society is moving into the  direction of a dichotomy is too simple. The classification
presented above shows that there is no clear break between those who hav e
favourable socio-economic positions and those who have not. The combined effect
of unequal chances on the fo rmal and the informal labour market and the dissimilar
rights the social security systems produces for individuals of differing backgrounds
make the demarcations between socio-economic categories t hat suffer from different
degrees of social exclusion rather fluent.
Secondly, and to some extent related to the former argume nt, it seems ambiguous
to label those who are socially excluded as a new underclass or even as belonging22
to the same status group: they cannot be considered  homogeneous as to economic
positions and life styles. However, as we emphasized before, technologica l
innovation and the demand for higher levels of productivity make an individual' s
chance to be excluded from the labour market ever more dependent of persona l
characteristics such as intelligence, the ability to learn, flexibility and health status.
These propensities are hard to influence by education  and training nor will they react
to incentives like a lower  replacement ratio. Contrary to such traditional production
systems like Fordism, in modern economies the chance to be excluded from th e
labour market is to a large extent related to given personal capacities. This is th e
common denominator of those that live at the margin of society.
The heterogeneous nature of the category of the socially excluded makes social
exclusion nowadays indeed to a social problem of u tmost importance because it may
jeopardy social stability. As we have seen before ethnic minorities have a n
unemployment rate which is about five times higher than average Dutc h
unemployment. So they are well represented among the socially excluded. What is
more, they are clearly recognizable because of dissimilar race and life styles. This
internal division within the socially excluded along the lines of race and subculture
prevents this category from effective organization in order to promote its interests.
Frustrations originating from an economic and social dead end situation lead t o
social aggression which is inner  directed. Thus among the deprived who compete at
the bottom of society for scarce goods and services there is a growing tendency to
perceive other groups in a similar position as the scapegoats. Hence the last decade
in those areas where social exclusion is concentrated one can observe growin g
racism and support for right wing social and political rad icalism that aims at 'sending
the aliens home'.
4. Policy Options: Some Conclusions
In the forgoing sections we argumented that economic changes are at the basis o f
increasing social exclusion in modern society. As these developments progress we
may expect that more and more workers will  be expelled from the labour market.23
This expulsion is selective because technological developments in productio n
processes make the worker's utility more than before dependent on persona l
characteristics and capacities that can be trained for only to a limited degree. This
implies that training the unemployed will not bring the solution we are waiting for,
i.e. a substantial decrease of structural unemployment.
We did not argue that the present volume of str uctural unemployment means that
there is not enough work to be done in society. Because of all kinds of socia l
arrangements related to the idea of Welfare Society for the employers the price of
labour in the formal labour market is relatively  high and this suppresses the demand.
This holds especially for low skilled labour which is consequently expelled to th e
informal black economy. So it seems appropriate to reduce the costs of labour i n
order to decrease structural unemployment.
This is precisely the kind of social policy the Dutch government is presentl y
following. Part of this policy concept  is also the decrease of the replacement ratio
and the execution of special programs aimed at training the long term unemployed
and providing them with work experience. Sofar the results are disappointing.
Dutch social policy has led to a situation where the expulsion of workers with a
low marginal utility has co ntinued while at the same time social security provisions
for those expelled have deteriorated. Therewith social exclusion increased. O f
course, one could argue - as some do - that the process o f decreasing the costs of low
skilled labour has not yet gone far enough. The proponents of this view often take
the US experience as an example. One has to admit that  the US were very successful
in creating jobs at the bottom of the labour market. However, this did not solve the
problem of social exclusion as this US policy ha s induced an increase of poverty. As
research shows, another negative effect of the US  model is that it leads to a decrease
of labour productivity because it takes away any incentive to achieve.
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In my view we are here confronted with one of the dile mmas of Welfare Society.
If one chooses to uphold income protection for the weak and powerless it seem s
almost impossible to solve the unemployment problem. If, on the other hand, on e
chooses to strive for full employment one has to brea k down the achievements of the
Welfare State which will without any  doubt lead to a substantial increase of poverty
and social exclusion. It is not too bold to predict that the social unrest produced by
the latter will in the end force society to pay a price.24
It seems as if the market oriented policies of the industrialized countries tha t
became so popular since the 1980s and which prescribed a withdrawal of the state
from economic and social affairs are now meet ing their limits. From the perspective
of international economic competition they may be advisable, but we can now see
that the social consequences they produce may trigger off processes of socia l
disintegration which, in turn, may have a detrimental effect on business.
From the national perspective it is utopian to think that one could influence the
parameters of international economic competition. Likewise the debate whether or
not one could get rid of new technology in order to avoid social exclusion seem s
academic to me. However, if one  accepts the view that modern economic processes
are behind the problem of  social exclusion the conclusion must be that it is only the
state that can counteract the negative social consequences by taking a more active
role.
This new concept of social policy should start from the idea that in a moder n
internationally oriented economy structural unemp loyment is not to be avoided. This
implies that social policy should break out of the chains that tie it to economi c
policy. The latter should continue to improve the conditions of business. Socia l
policy, however, should take its  own responsibility and direct itself to neutralize the
negative effects the labour market has for the distribution of scarce goods an d
services at the bottom of society. It should be complem entary by satisfying the needs
that cannot be fulfilled by the market. Therewith competition at the bottom o f
society and social exclusion can be mitigated.
If one accepts the fact th at structural unemployment is of a permanent character
in our economy social policy aimed at reducing social exclusion has two mai n
targets to strive for. The first one is to reconsider policies of income redistribution
in order to prevent the rise of  poverty: if we accept the idea that many of our fellow
citizens are outside the labou r market we must not hesitate to face the problem how
to finance their incomes. If our social policy manages to be successful in thi s
respect, there is left a second problem to be solved: how can we integrate thos e
without a job into our society by pro viding them with life purposes that enable them
to feel included instead of excluded. This involves a tremendous change of culture
implying the growth of new values as to the functions of work in society.25
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